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Abstract
I introduce risk-averse preferences, labor-leisure choice, capital, individual productivity
shocks, and market incompleteness to the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model of search
and matching and explore the model's cyclical properties. There are four main ndings.
First and foremost, the baseline model can generate the observed large volatility of unem-
ployment and vacancies with a realistic replacement ratio of the unemployment insurance
benets of 64 percent. Second, labor-leisure choice plays a crucial role in generating the
large volatilities; additional utility from leisure when unemployed makes the value of un-
employment close to the value of employment, which is crucial in generating a strong
amplication, even with the moderate replacement ratio. Besides, it contributes to the
amplication through an adjustment in the intensive margin of labor supply. Third, the
borrowing constraint or uninsured individual productivity shocks do not signicantly aect
the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies: Most workers are well insured only
with self-insurance. Fourth, the model better replicates the business cycle properties of
the U.S. economy, thanks to the co-existence of adjustments in the intensive and extensive
margins of labor supply and the stronger amplication.
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11 Introduction
The main purpose of the paper is to embed the standard labor search and matching model into the
standard business cycle model with risk-averse workers, labor-leisure choice, capital, individual
productivity shocks, and market incompleteness, and re-examine the puzzle presented by Shimer
(2005). The Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model has become the standard theory
of equilibrium unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (2001)). However,
Shimer (2005) pointed out that the Mortensen-Pissarides model with labor productivity shocks
cannot replicate the volatility of unemployment and vacancies observed in the postwar U.S. data.
The volatilities of unemployment and vacancies in the Mortensen-Pissarides model with Shimer's
(2005) calibration strategy are about one-tenth of their volatilities in the U.S. data.
In the baseline model that I construct in this paper, workers can accumulate capital but the
market is incomplete; workers cannot write a contract to insure away the individual productivity
shocks and unemployment shocks, but they can self-insure by accumulating capital. In addition,
workers in the model choose how many hours to work and how many hours to enjoy leisure.
By comparing the properties of the baseline model and the Mortensen-Pissarides model with
Shimer's (2005) calibration, I will explore the role played by the two additional features, labor-
leisure choice and market incompleteness, in shaping the cyclical properties of unemployment
and vacancies.
The second purpose of the paper is to compare the business cycle properties of the baseline
model with those of the standard real business cycle (RBC) model. The current model can also
be considered a standard real business cycle model that is extended by incorporating search and
matching in the labor market. Since the current model generates 
uctuations in employment
(extensive margin) and average hours worked (intensive margin), the model has the capacity to
match a variety of cyclical properties of U.S. business cycles, especially those associated with the
labor market.
There are four main ndings. First, the baseline model successfully replicates the observed
large volatility of unemployment and vacancies. In other words, the model has a strong ampli-
fying mechanism. As will be shown, the intuition is similar to how the Mortensen-Pissarides
model calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) successfully generates a large volatility
of unemployment and vacancies. However, the baseline model developed in the current paper
achieves the strong amplication with a reasonably low replacement ratio for unemployment
insurance benets of 64 percent, while the calibrated value of the replacement rate in Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) is 95.5 percent.
My second nding is that labor-leisure choice plays a key role for the main result in two ways.
Utility from leisure narrows the gap between the value of being unemployed and that of being
employed, even with the reasonable replacement rate of 64 percent. The small gap between the
two values is the key property for the model to exhibit a strong amplication, as Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) argue using the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. Naturally, the model's
strong amplication vanishes when the utility from leisure is turned o. Without utility from
leisure, a very high replacement ratio of unemployment insurance benets like the one used by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (95.5 percent) is needed for a strong amplication. In other
words, the model implies that utility from leisure is equivalent to approximately 30 percent of
the replacement ratio, which is the dierence between 95.5 percent and 64 percent. Labor-leisure
2choice also helps to generate strong amplication through an adjustment in the intensive margin
of labor supply over the business cycles.
Third, I nd that the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies are aected little by
relaxing the borrowing constraint or strengthening or shutting down the individual productivity
shocks. In the canonical incomplete-markets model, even if workers are not allowed to trade state-
contingent securities, workers save and self-insure suciently so that the incomplete-markets
model with a strict borrowing constraint or varying degree of individual productivity shocks
behaves like its complete-markets counterpart at the aggregate level. Under this situation, a
relaxed borrowing constraint or changing volatility of the individual productivity shocks has
little eect on the cyclical properties of the model. This intuition carries over to the cyclical
properties of unemployment and vacancies studied in this paper.
Fourth, I nd that the model shows improvement in replicating many cyclical properties of
the U.S. labor market that the standard RBC models or the previous RBC models with labor
market friction (Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995)) cannot produce. This is mainly due to
the labor market friction and the strong amplication mechanism of the model. In particular,
compared with the previous RBC models with labor market friction, the calibrated model in
the current paper generates a stronger volatility of unemployment and vacancies, and a strong
negative correlation between the two.1 On the other hand, the cyclical properties of the baseline
model with respect to consumption and investment are similar to those of the standard real
business cycle model. This similarity echoes the well-established ndings of Krusell and Smith
(1998) that incomplete-markets models exhibit cyclical properties of aggregate variables similar
to those in their complete-markets counterparts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
summarizes the cyclical properties of the U.S. economy. The model's performance is measured
by the extent to which the model can replicate the properties. In Section 4, the baseline model is
presented. Section 5 discusses the calibration of the model, and Section 6 oers a brief discussion
of the solution methods. Section 7 presents the main results of the paper and discusses them.
Section 8 concludes. Appendix A gives details of the computation.
2 Related Literature
The current paper is built on two groups in the literature. The rst group is trying to solve the
puzzle presented by Shimer (2005) mainly by modifying the basic Mortensen-Pissarides model.
The second group extends the standard real business cycle model by introducing labor market
search and matching. To the best of my knowledge, the model in the current paper is the rst
one that combines the incomplete-markets real business cycle model with labor market search
and matching in the general equilibrium framework.
The rst group of research starts with Shimer (2005), who nds that the standard Mortensen-
Pissarides model of labor market search and matching with aggregate shocks to labor productivity
and Nash bargaining cannot generate a large volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Hall
1 The stronger negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies is also due to the timing assumption,
by which the employment/unemployment adjustment occurs in the same period as the vacancy posting. On
the other hand, Andolfatto (1996) assumes that it takes one model period (a quarter) for unemployment to
respond to the vacancy posting.
3(2005) argues that the problem lies in the Nash bargaining assumption in wage setting. He points
out that if there is stickiness in real wage setting, instead of real wage elastically responding to
changes in productivity, the labor search and matching model can produce a large volatility
of unemployment and vacancies. If real wages are sticky, rms' prots respond more to the
changes in productivity, which leads to the larger volatility of vacancy postings and, eventually,
unemployment.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that the problem does not lie in the model itself but in
the way the model is calibrated. To make their point, they use the same Mortensen-Pissarides
model that Shimer (2005) uses, but employ an alternative calibration strategy and show that
the same model can generate the degree of amplication as strong as that observed in data. The
key feature of their calibration strategy is to pin down the replacement ratio of unemployment
insurance benets and the parameter representing the worker's bargaining weight to match two
observed targets, namely, the average labor market tightness and the elasticity of wage with
respect to labor productivity.
Costain and Reiter (2006) propose that cohort-specic technology shocks can improve the
model's performance. Their model generates a higher volatility of unemployment and vacancies
because the number of vacancies posted is sensitive to the value of new matches, not to the value
of existing matches. The cohort-specic technology shocks can increase the volatility of the value
of new matches, without aecting the volatility of the value of existing matches. In turn, the
volatility of vacancies increases without increasing the volatility of average labor productivity,
which is much less sensitive to the volatility of the value of new matches. Pries (2007) introduces
heterogeneity across workers' productivity and shows that the composition eect associated with
the productivity of workers helps to generate a high volatility of unemployment and vacancies.
Pissarides (2009) argues that the standard search model can generate a large unemployment
volatility with sunk xed matching costs.
In the second group of research related to the current paper, Andolfatto (1996) and Merz
(1995) are the seminal works. Both extend the standard complete-markets RBC model by
introducing Mortensen-Pissarides type labor market friction and point out that the performance
of real business cycle models can be improved by incorporating labor market frictions in the
form of labor market search and matching. However, neither is very successful in generating the
observed cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies, in particular, the high volatility
and the negative correlation. The novelty of the current paper is that the model developed here
successfully replicates these properties of the data. In addition, the model developed in this
paper features market incompleteness and thus can be used to investigate the importance of
market incompleteness in shaping the cyclical properties of the model.
Within the complete-markets framework, Gertler and Trigari (2009) extend the models of
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) by introducing staggered multi-period wage contracting and
show that their model exhibits a strong amplication, along with various improvements in repli-
cating U.S. business cycle properties. Den Haan et al. (2000) extends the real business cycle
model with a labor market friction by introducing endogenous match destruction.
Regarding the incomplete-markets framework, an innovative work by Gomes et al. (2001)
combines the incomplete-markets real business cycle model with labor market search and suc-
cessfully generates a large volatility of unemployment. However, the model is dierent from
4the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model; there is no matching or unlled vacancy in the model.
More recently, Krusell et al. (forthcoming), Bils et al. (2009), and Shao and Silos (2007) construct
models that feature saving, incomplete markets, and labor market friction as in the current paper.
However, none of the papers has a worker's labor-leisure choice. Therefore, none can analyze the
importance of the labor-leisure choice in shaping the cyclical properties of the model or analyze
the cyclical properties of adjustments in the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply,
as I do in the current paper. I also investigate the importance of the borrowing constraint and
the individual productivity shocks in shaping the cyclical properties of the incomplete-markets
model. More specically, Krusell et al. (forthcoming) use the model to conduct a welfare analysis
of the unemployment insurance program. They do not have heterogeneity in terms of individual
productivity of workers. In other words, the version of the model developed here without the
labor-leisure decision and heterogeneous productivity of workers is similar to their model.2 Bils
et al. (2009) do have heterogeneity with respect to match quality, and they investigate the impli-
cations of the heterogeneity with respect to both match quality and asset holding on the cyclical
properties of the model. Shao and Silos (2007) study the implications of wealth distribution
on the cyclical properties. They do not include heterogeneity of individual productivity, either.
Jung (2006) constructs a version of the real business cycle model with labor market search and
marching and a representative family and shows that the model can replicate the volatility of
unemployment and vacancies with reasonable parameter values.
The way in which market incompleteness is introduced in the current paper follows Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994); workers in the model face idiosyncratic uncertainty and can only
self-insure by saving. Krusell and Smith (1998) introduce aggregate uncertainty into the model
by Aiyagari (1994). Regarding the solution method, the approximate equilibrium developed by
Krusell and Smith (1998) is employed. The model developed in this paper can be considered an
extension of their model in the sense that the formation and resolution of matches is endogenous
in the current model, while it is exogenous in Krusell and Smith's (1998) model.
3 Facts
Table 1 summarizes the business cycle facts of the U.S. economy between 1951 and 2009. All
data are quarterly. The cyclical properties are computed using the log of the data after ltering
with the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) lter. Following the standard practice in the business cycle
literature for quarterly data, a smoothing parameter of 1600 is used.3
The rst block of the table (the rst three rows) contains the cyclical properties of output
and its major components, namely, consumption and investment. Consumption in the table
represents total consumption expenditure, which includes nondurable and durable consumption
goods as well as services. The volatility of nondurable consumption goods is slightly lower than
total consumption. Investment in the table includes both xed investment, which consists of
residential and nonresidential investment, and change in private inventories.
2 In the previous version of the current paper, collective bargaining was used instead of the more standard
bilateral bargaining, which was used in their paper.
3 Shimer (2005) uses a smoothing parameter of 105. According to Hornstein et al. (2005) (see Table 1), using the
smoothing parameter of 105 instead of the standard value of 1600 does not generate a substantial dierence in
terms of the volatility of the important labor market variables relative to the volatility of labor productivity.
5Table 1: Cyclical properties of U.S. economy: 1951:1-2009:31;2
Relative Auto- Cross-correlation of output with
Variable SD% SD%3 corr xt 2 xt 1 xt xt+1 xt+2
Output 1.58 1.00 0.84 0.59 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.59
Consumption4 1.27 0.80 0.83 0.69 0.83 0.85 0.69 0.46
Investment5 7.34 4.64 0.80 0.56 0.76 0.88 0.72 0.48
Unemployment rate (u) 12.95 8.19 0.87  0:36  0:64  0:84  0:85  0:71
Vacancies (v) 14.10 8.91 0.91 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.82 0.65
Market tightness (v/u) 26.44 16.71 0.90 0.48 0.73 0.89 0.85 0.69
Job nding rate 8.38 5.30 0.80 0.43 0.67 0.82 0.82 0.66
Aggregate hours6 1.58 1.00 0.88 0.39 0.66 0.87 0.89 0.76
Employment6 1.05 0.66 0.87 0.34 0.60 0.80 0.85 0.76
Average weekly hours7 0.51 0.32 0.77 0.58 0.69 0.72 0.54 0.31
Labor share8 0.77 0.49 0.75  0:34  0:30  0:19 0.07 0.27
Output per hour 0.80 0.50 0.68 0.40 0.35 0.26  0:09  0:34
Wage9 0.90 0.57 0.74 0.07 0.05 0.07  0:02  0:07
Output per worker 0.97 0.61 0.70 0.60 0.72 0.76 0.45 0.15
Compensation per worker10 1.00 0.63 0.74 0.32 0.47 0.60 0.35 0.18
1 Source: BEA (output and its components), BLS (labor market-related data), Conference Board
(help-wanted advertising index used as the proxy for the number of vacancies).
2 All data are quarterly between 1951:1 and 2009:3. Logs of the data are ltered using the H-P
lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
3 Relative to the standard deviation of output.
4 Including nondurable and durable consumption goods as well as services.
5 Including residential and nonresidential investment as well as changes in private inventories.
6 Based on the establishment survey.
7 Based on the household survey.
8 Computed using the method proposed by Hansen and Prescott (1995).
9 Computed as output per hour multiplied by labor share.
10 Computed as output per worker multiplied by labor share.
The second block of the table (the fourth to the seventh rows) contains the cyclical properties
of unemployment, vacancies, their ratio (which in the literature is called market tightness) and
the probability that a worker in the unemployment pool nds a job. The data on the number
of vacancies are constructed in the same way as in Shimer (2005); the help-wanted advertising
6index compiled by the Conference Board is used as a proxy for the number of vacancies. Monthly
job nding probability is constructed in the way suggested by Shimer (2005). For monthly data
series, the average of the monthly data in each quarter is used. The properties of these data
are important because these are the ones that Shimer (2005) claims the standard Mortensen-
Pissarides model fails to replicate.
The third block of the table (the eighth to the tenth rows) is associated with the total labor
supply, and adjustments in the extensive and intensive labor supply. The fourth and last block
of the table (the last ve rows) is associated with productivity and wages.
The key features of the cyclical properties of the U.S. economy presented in Table 1 are
summarized as follows. The performance of the model constructed in the current paper will be
judged by how well the model replicates these cyclical properties shown in Table 1, in particular,
the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies.
1. (Output) Volatility of detrended output is 1.58 percent. Output is strongly persistent,
with an autocorrelation of 0.84.
2. (Consumption) Consumption is less volatile than output (consumption volatility is 0.8
times output volatility) and strongly procyclical.
3. (Investment) Investment is substantially more volatile than output (investment volatility
is 4.6 times output volatility) and strongly procyclical.
4. (Unemployment and vacancies) The unemployment rate is about eight times as volatile
as output and strongly countercyclical. The number of vacancies posted is about nine times
as volatile as output and strongly procyclical.
5. (Market tightness) As a result, the market tightness (the ratio of vacancies over the
unemployment rate) is about 17 times as volatile as output and strongly procyclical. What
is implied is that the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is strongly negative
( 0:91). This is typically shown as the Beveridge curve.
6. (Job nding rate) Job nding rate is about ve times as volatile as output and strongly
procyclical.
7. (Aggregate hours) Aggregate hours worked is as volatile as output, strongly procyclical,
and, more important, lags output by one quarter.
8. (Employment and average hours) If the volatility of the aggregate hours is disaggre-
gated into the volatility of employment (extensive margin) and the volatility of hours per
worker (intensive margin), the former accounts for two-thirds of the volatility of the ag-
gregate hours.4 The latter accounts for one-third. Employment lags the cycle by about
one quarter. This translates into a strong correlation between output and lagged aggregate
hours. Meanwhile, there is no lead or lag with respect to the average hours worked.
9. (Labor share) Labor share (share of total income earned by employees) is half as volatile
as output and mildly countercyclical.
4 I use the employment data series based on the establishment survey. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) point
out that the employment data based on the household survey exhibit dierent cyclical properties.
710. (Productivity and wages) Productivity measured by output per hour is less volatile
(about half) than output and weakly procyclical (correlation of 0.26). Wage measured by
labor income per hour is also less volatile (relative standard deviation of 0.57) and close
to acyclical. Both output per worker and compensation per worker are less volatile than
output (standard deviation of about 60 percent) and strongly procyclical.
4 Model
The model is best described as the incomplete-markets general equilibrium model of Krusell and
Smith (1998), which itself is the model of Aiyagari (1994) with aggregate uncertainty, extended
by incorporating labor market friction in the form of the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
4.1 Preferences
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by a mass of innitely lived workers and rms. The
total measure of workers is normalized to unity. A worker maximizes his expected lifetime utility.









where  is the time discount factor, and E0 is an expectation operator with information available
at period 0. ct is the consumption of the worker in period t. ht is the leisure time enjoyed in
period t. The period utility function u(c;h) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave with respect to each of c and h.
There are a large number of rms. Each rm is risk-neutral and maximizes the present value
of its prot stream. The rms discount their future prots using the equilibrium real interest
rate.
4.2 Endowment
A worker is endowed with capital a0 in the initial period and one unit of time each period.
Workers can use their time for either work or leisure. Hours for work and leisure in period t are
denoted as `t and ht, respectively. The following time constraint must be satised in any period:
ht + `t = 1 (2)
4.3 Production Technology
In order to produce, a worker and a rm have to be matched. I call a matched worker employed
(e = 1) and an unmatched worker unemployed (e = 0). A rm can also be either matched (e = 1)
or unmatched (e = 0). Matched pairs have access to the following production technology:
Yt = e
ztF(Kt;Lt) (3)
where Kt is capital input, Lt is labor input, Yt is output, and ezt is total factor productivity
(TFP). z has a nite support Z = fz1;z2;:::;znzg and follows a rst-order Markov process with
8the transition probability z
zz0. It is assumed that the production function F(K;L) satises
constant returns to scale and is strictly increasing and strictly concave with respect to each
input. Capital stock depreciates at a constant rate .
Labor input is measured by the eciency unit. When a worker's current individual pro-
ductivity is denoted by st, and the worker works for `t hours, the labor input is st`t. s has a
nite support S = fs1;s2;:::;snsg and follows a rst-order Markov process with the transition
probability s
ss0. Notice that s is not match specic.
4.4 Job Turnover Technology
Workers without a job search for a job. Matching is random. There is no cost for job search.
There is no search intensity decision. The probability of nding a job is the same across all
workers who are searching for a job. Unmatched rms search for a worker by posting a vacancy.
The cost of posting a vacancy is represented by a parameter . The probability of nding a
worker is the same across all rms that are searching for a worker.
Let the total number of workers that are employed and unemployed in period t be denoted as
Nt and Ut, respectively. Since the total number of workers is normalized to one, the number of
employed workers Nt can be expressed as Nt = 1   Ut. Let Vt be the total number of vacancies
posted by unmatched rms in period t.
For a matched pair, there is a constant probability  that the match is dissolved. Because
of the law of large numbers, when the measure of the employed workers (which is equal to the
measure of matched pairs) is Nt, the measure of matches that dissolve can be expressed as Nt.
There is no on-the-job search.
I assume that a worker whose match is just dissolved can immediately start searching for a
new job. It implies that a worker whose match is dissolved but who immediately nds the next
job does not experience an unemployed spell in the model. This timing assumption is needed to
achieve a proper calibration; in the baseline calibration, a period will be set as a quarter, which is
the choice of the standard real business cycle models. However, if a worker in a dissolved match
is forced to stay unemployed for at least one period, the average duration of unemployment
spells will be longer than one model period (which is one quarter). It is impossible to reconcile
the implied average duration of unemployment spells (longer than a quarter) with the monthly
average job nding probability of 45 percent (Shimer (2005)) and the average unemployment
rate of 5.67 percent. In order to distinguish between the number of unemployed workers and the
number of workers that are looking for a job, I use St for the measure of workers who are looking
for a job. By construction, the following holds:
St = Ut + Nt (4)
It is assumed that the number of new matches Mt is a function of the total number of workers
looking for a job (St) and the total number of vacancies posted (Vt). Formally, Mt is characterized
as follows.
Mt = min(fm(St;Vt);St;Vt) (5)
The calibration makes sure that Mt = fm(St;Vt) < min(St;Vt) always holds. Therefore, I call
the function fm(S;V ) the aggregate matching function.
94.5 Market Structure
Capital is rented in the competitive market, with the rental price rt. It follows that the rental
price of capital is equal to the marginal product of capital net of depreciation in equilibrium.
Labor can be supplied only in a matched pair. All rms are assumed to be owned by all workers
jointly. As a result, the sum of rms' prots in each period, net of total costs for posting
vacancies, is shared by the owners (workers) equally as a lump-sum transfer dt.
Remember that production takes place in each of the matched pairs. In other words, there
is no aggregate production function. However, because the capital rental market is competitive,
all producing pairs have to oer the same rate of return of capital in equilibrium. Since the
production technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, this further implies that
the capital-labor ratio will be equated across all the worker-rm pairs in equilibrium. Therefore,
one can think of a stand-in aggregate production function with the aggregate capital stock Kt
and aggregate labor supply Lt. The rate of return of capital rt and the marginal product of labor
pt in all the matched pairs will be the same as the respective marginal products implied by the
aggregate production function.
Markets are incomplete in the sense that workers are not allowed to trade securities contingent
on the state of the world or individual characteristics and thus to insure against aggregate
or individual shock. Against the unemployment shock, partial insurance is provided by the
government in the form of unemployment insurance, which is discussed below. Apart from the
publicly provided unemployment insurance, all that workers can do is to save in the form of
capital and self-insure. Moreover, workers' capital holding is constrained by the lower bound a.
In the baseline case, I assume a = 0; i.e., workers cannot borrow. In one of the experiments in
Section 7, I will investigate the implications of a relaxed borrowing constraint.
4.6 Unemployment Insurance
The government runs an unemployment insurance program. An unemployed worker receives
the unemployment insurance benets of bt. As will be specied, bt depends on the individual
productivity of a worker. In order to nance the program, the government taxes the labor income
of all employed workers using a proportional tax of rate .
In each period, the balance of the program might be either positive or negative, depending
mainly on the number of workers employed and unemployed. The balance of the program will
be equally distributed across all workers in a lump-sum transfer every period. In particular, if
the total contribution is larger (smaller) than the total benets, the dierence is distributed to
all workers as a lump-sum transfer (tax). tt denotes the per capita balance of the unemployment
insurance program in period t and naturally takes a positive (negative) value when the total
contribution (tax) is larger than the total benets.
4.7 Bargaining
The hours worked by the worker, `t, and the surplus-sharing rule, wt (which represents the
proportion of the total surplus taken by the worker), are jointly determined as the solution of
the generalized Nash bargaining. It implies that the hours `t maximize the joint surplus. More
specics of the bargaining will be discussed in Section 4.11, after characterizing the values of the
worker and the rm.
104.8 Recursive Formulation
Equilibrium is dened recursively. From now on, time subscripts are dropped and variables in the
next period are denoted by a prime. A worker can be characterized by a triplet (e;s;a), where
e 2 E = f0;1g is the employment status, s 2 S = fs1;s2;:::;snsg is the individual productivity
shock, and a 2 A = [a;1) is the capital holding. e = 0 denotes unemployed or unmatched,
while e = 1 denotes employed or matched. For ease of notation, I dene x as a probability
measure over X, which is a  algebra generated by the set X  E S A. x represents a type
distribution of workers. Before proceeding further, it is useful to describe below the sequence
of events in a period. Notice that since z follows a rst-order Markov process, the current z is
sucient to predict the future realizations of z.
1. Beginning of period. Shocks (z;s) are realized. The aggregate state is (z;e x), where e x is
the type distribution before matches are destroyed and created.
2. Matches are destroyed and created. Specically, N(e x) matches are destroyed. S(e x) is the
measure of workers searching for a job. Remember that N(e x) workers can immediately
start searching. e V (z;e x) vacancies are posted. M(z;e x) matches are created.
3. The aggregate state variable is (z;x), where x is the type distribution after matches are
destroyed and created.
4. Bargaining takes place; `(z;x;s;a) and w(z;x;s;a) are determined.
5. Firms rent capital and produce. The rate of return to capital and labor productivity are
r(z;x) and p(z;x), respectively.
6. Given the bargaining outcome, prices, dividend income from rms d(z;x), unemployment
insurance benet b(s;a), and the lump-sum transfer from the unemployment insurance
program, t(z;x), workers decide how much to consume and save.
7. e x0 is the type distribution of workers after the consumption-saving decision.
Notice that employment, unemployment and vacancies adjust before production takes place. On
the other hand, in the related model by Andolfatto (1996), it is assumed that they move after
production takes place. Such a timing assumption forces there to be at least a lag of one period
between production and match creation and destruction, which articially lags employment and
unemployment relative to output. To the contrary, in the current set-up, such a lag is avoided. I
will come back to the implication of the timing assumption when I evaluate the cyclical properties
of the model.
Using the aggregate states, the total measure of workers searching for a job, S, the number of
matches, M, the aggregate (or average, because the size of the total population is normalized to





1e=0 de x + 
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where 1condition is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the condition is true, and 0
otherwise. e V (z;e x) is the total number of vacancies posted, which is determined by the optimal
entry decision of unmatched rms and thus is a function of aggregate states. I will discuss the
determination of e V (z;e x) later. Furthermore, these functions can be used to construct functions








e V (z;e x)
(11)
Finally, I dene below the two transition functions for the probability measure, corresponding
to the type distribution of workers before (e x) and after (x) matches are destroyed and created:
e x
0 = e fx(z;x) (12)
x = fx(z;e x) (13)
4.9 Worker's Problem
The problem of a worker is dened recursively in this section. Given the law of motion of the
type distribution, e fx(z;x) and fx(z;e x), and functions for the real interest rate, r(z;x), labor
productivity, p(z;x), dividends, d(z;x), worker's share of surplus, w(z;x;s;a), hours worked,
`(z;x;s;a), unemployment insurance benet, b(s;a), lump-sum transfer from the unemployment
insurance program, t(z;x), and the job nding probability, fw(z;e x), the worker's problem can



























0 = y + (1 + r(z;x))a + d(z;x) + t(z;x) (15)
h =

1   `(z;x;s;a) if e = 1 (employed)
1 if e = 0 (unemployed) (16)
y =

p(z;x)s`(z;x;s;a)w(z;x;s;a)(1   ) if e = 1 (employed)
b(s;a) if e = 0 (unemployed) (17)
x
0 = fx(z
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Let ga(z;x;e;s;a), gc(z;x;e;s;a) be the optimal decision rules for saving and consumption,
respectively, associated with the optimal value function that solves the problem above.
4.10 Firm's Problem
I will rst characterize the problem of unmatched rms and go on to characterize the problem of
matched rms. An unmatched rm can enter the market by paying a xed cost  and posting
a vacancy. With probability fj(z;e x), a rm that enters the market will be matched and start
producing later in the same period. Formally, the value of an unmatched rm at the beginning
of period, e J(z;e x) can be characterized by the following Bellman equation:





[1e=0J(z;x;s;a) + 1e=1J(z;x;s;a)]de x









Notice two things. First, the second term of (19) contains two parts: one associated with those
who were unemployed at the beginning of the period (e = 0) and the other associated with those
were employed at the beginning of the period but just lost their job (e = 1). Second, the last
term is associated with the case where the rm is not matched with a worker.
Assuming free entry, rms keep entering the market until the value of entering the market is
pushed down to zero so that a rm is indierent between entering the market and not entering
at the margin. Formally, free entry implies:
e J(z;e x) = 0 (20)
Combining the free-entry condition (20) with the Bellman equation of an unmatched rm (19)
yields:
 =
fm(S(e x);V (z;e x))
V (z;e x) S(e x)
Z
X
[1e=0J(z;x;s;a) + 1e=1J(z;x;s;a)]de x (21)
13This equation implicitly characterizes the number of vacancies (number of rms entering the
market) e V (z;e x). I also use V (z;x) as the forecasted number of vacancies posted, conditional on
state (z;x).5 With V (z;x), the lump-sum dividend d(z;x) is characterized as follows:




Given the law of motion for x, e fx(z;x) and fx(z;e x), optimal saving function, ga(z;x;e;s;a),
and functions for the real interest rate, r(z;x), the worker's share of the surplus, w(z;x;s;a),
hours worked, `(z;x;s;a), the value of the rm matched with a worker of type (s;a) can be




















zF(k;s`(z;x;s;a))   (r(z;x) + )k)(1   w(z;x;s;a)) (24)
a
0 = ga(z;x;1;s;a) (25)
x
0 = fx(z
0; e fx(z;x)) (26)
Note that the formulation above already takes into account that the value of being unmatched,
e J(z;e x), is zero due to free entry (see equation (20)). j(z;x;s;a) is the function for the current
prot of a matched rm, which is the total surplus multiplied by the rm's share out of the
surplus (1   w(z;x;s;a)). The total surplus is the output generated by the match minus the
rental cost of capital.
Notice that the problem faced by the rm is virtually static; the current choice of k does not
aect the future value of the rm. Therefore, it is easy to see that the optimal capital input
k(z;x;s;a) satises the following marginal condition:
r(z;x) = e
zFk(k(z;x;s;a);s`(z;x;s;a))    (27)
Moreover, applying Euler's theorem to the production function and the marginal condition
just obtained above, a simple formula for the current prot can be obtained as follows:
j(z;x;s;a) = e
zF`(k(z;x;s;a);s`(z;x;s;a))(1   w(z;x;s;a))
= p(z;x)s`(z;x;s;a)(1   w(z;x;s;a)) (28)














5 The use of V (z;x) helps simplifying the problem by eliminating the need for carrying both x and e x for the
problem of agents. In particular, because of the use of V (z;x), the dividend function d(z;x) does not need e x
as an argument. Since d(z;x) is small relative to other income or consumption of agents, using V (z;x) instead
of e V (z; e x) does not signicantly aect the main result, although accuracy of the forecasting function d(z;x) is
negatively aected (See Table 8 in Appendix A).




The worker and the rm in a matched pair bargain jointly over the hours worked, `(z;x;s;a), and
surplus sharing rule, w(z;x;s;a). I use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine
the bargaining outcome. Let  and 1    denote the Nash bargaining parameter for the worker








where W(z;x;1;s;a;`;w) and J(z;x;s;a;`;w) are the values of matched workers and rms con-
ditional on the current (`;w), respectively. W(z;x;0;s;a) is the value of the worker conditional
on being unemployed. Notice that it is already taken into account that the value of an unmatched
rm (which is the reservation value of the bargaining rm) is zero in equilibrium because of free
entry. Also notice that the value of an unemployed worker or the reservation value of the worker
in the bargaining does not depend on (`;w).
4.12 Equilibrium
Denition 1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive equilibrium is a list of functions W(z;x;e;s;a),
J(z;x;s;a), e J(z;e x), ga(z;x;e;s;a), gc(z;x;e;s;a), `(z;x;s;a), w(z;x;s;a), r(z;x), p(z;x), d(z;x),
e V (z;e x), t(z;x), fx(z;e x), and e fx(z;x) such that:
1. W(z;x;e;s;a) is a solution to the worker's optimization problem, and ga(z;x;e;s;a), and
gc(z;x;e;s;a) are associated optimal decision rules for saving and consumption, respec-
tively.
2. J(z;x;s;a) is a solution to the matched rm's optimization problem.
3. Free entry of rms, i.e., e J(z;e x) = 0. The number of vacancies e V (z;e x) is determined such
that the free-entry condition is satised.
4. The law of motion associated with x, characterized by fx(z;e x) and e fx(z;x), is consistent
with the optimal decision rule for capital holding ga(z;x;e;s;a) and the law of motion
associated with the individual productivity shock s and employment status e.
5. The rental price of capital is equal to the marginal product of capital minus depreciation,
as in (27).
6. (`(z;x;s;a);w(z;x;s;a)) is determined as the solution to the generalized Nash bargaining
between a worker and a rm.










15Table 2: Summary of the baseline calibration
Parameter Value1 Remarks
 0.9837 Time discount factor. Calibrated to match K=Y = 101.
 1.5000 Coecient of relative risk aversion.
  5.2210 Calibrated to match the average hours worked to be 0.33.
 0.5000 Frisch labor supply elasticity.
 0.2890 Capital share of output.
 0.0150 Depreciation rate of capital.
z 0.9795 Persistence of TFP shock.
z 0.0044 Standard deviation of innovation to TFP shock.
s 0.9956 Persistence of individual productivity shock.
s 0.0323 Standard deviation of innovation to individual productivity shock.
 0.6600 Matching elasticity. Calibrated to match relative size of U and V.
 0.1000 Separation probability.

 0.6246 Job nding probability.
 0.1148 Cost of posting a vacancy.
 0.6400 Replacement ratio of unemployment insurance benet.
 0.0370 Unemployment insurance tax rate.
 0.0701 Nash bargaining parameter for workers.
1 Quarterly value.
where p(z;x) is characterized by (30).
8. The lump-sum dividend d(z;x) is determined as the total prots of the current period net
of the total costs of vacancy posting, as in (22).
5 Calibration
A period is assumed to be a quarter. Table 2 summarizes the parameter values, with remarks
about how each of the parameters is calibrated. The parameters can be classied into three
groups based on how they are calibrated. The rst group of parameters is calibrated based on
independent empirical evidence (calibration does not require solving the model). The second
group of parameters is calibrated using the steady-state version of the model, which is the
baseline model described in the previous section but without the aggregate TFP shock. Each of
the parameters are calibrated, jointly with other parameters, to match the time series average of
the closely related data. The third set of parameters is calibrated using the model with aggregate
shock. Each parameter is calibrated to match a cyclical statistic that is closely related to the
parameter. More detailed descriptions of the calibration strategy follow.
165.1 Preferences
For the period utility function, I use the following functional form called the Greenwood-Hercowitz-
Human (GHH) preference, which is developed in Greenwood et al. (1988).
u(c;h) =










The unique feature of the GHH preference is that the preference implies that there is no income
eect. The GHH preference is extensively used in the small open economy models and recently
in models with news shocks, since the preference helps these models to better replicate the data,
mainly through a strong response of labor supply to productivity shocks. In the current model,
the reason is dierent; with the standard utility function, the hours worked as a bargaining
solution keep decreasing as the asset holding (and consumption) increases, and eventually the
value of being unemployed exceeds the value of being employed, when the hours worked reach
zero. This is because being unemployed entitles a worker to the unemployment insurance benets
with zero labor supply, while employed workers do not receive labor income or the benets even
if labor supply is zero as well. On the other hand, since the optimal labor supply is independent
of the asset holding with the GHH preference, it is possible to make sure that the value of being
unemployed does not exceed the value of being employed as the asset holding increases. This
property helps to avoid the problem that workers with a large amount of wealth nd it optimal
to stop searching and stay unemployed.6
The parameter representing the coecient of relative risk aversion, , is set at 1:5, which is the
standard value in the literature.  represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Considering
that the empirical estimates of  are between 0.1 and 1, I choose  = 0:5. The parameter  
is calibrated endogenously (i.e., jointly with other parameters) such that, in the steady state of
the model, the average hours worked is 0.33 of the disposable time of employed workers. This
is broadly consistent with the evidence from the time-use survey. The time discount factor  is
also calibrated endogenously. In particular,  is calibrated such that the annualized (quarterly)
capital output ratio in the steady-state version of the model is 2.5 (10). I obtain  = 0:9837.
5.2 Production Technology






 is calibrated to match the average capital share of income in the U.S. economy computed using
data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which is 0:289. This number is
slightly lower than the commonly used value, which is around one-third, because rms' prots
are not included in the capital share. Instead, rms' prots are part of the total surplus, which is
associated with the proportion 1 . The depreciation rate  is set at 0:015 (6.0 percent annual
depreciation). The depreciation rate  is calculated using the average ratio of total capital
consumption over total capital stock (computed using NIPA data).
6 Although it can be an interesting model of wealth-rich workers withdrawing from the labor market or retiring
early, this is not the focus of the current paper.
17The TFP shock z is constructed by approximating the following AR(1) process using the
method developed by Ada and Cooper (2003) with the number of abscissas nz = 5.
z
0 = zz + z (34)
where z  N(0;2
z). Typically z is set at 0:95 and z is set at 0:007 based on the estimates
obtained by Cooley and Prescott (1995) using the Solow residuals. However, when the original
AR(1) process is approximated using a Markov chain with a relatively small number of abscissas,
there is no guarantee that the obtained Markov process replicates important characteristics of
the original AR(1) process. Therefore, I calibrate z and z such that the obtained Markov
chain replicates the unconditional variance and autocorrelation of the AR(1) process with the
persistence of 0.95 and the standard deviation of 0.007. This process generates z = 0:9795 and
z = 0:0044.
The individual productivity shock is constructed in the same way as z; the following AR(1)
process is approximated using the method developed by Ada and Cooper (2003) with the number
of abscissas ns = 3.
s
0 = ss + s (35)
where s  N(0;2
s). There are various estimates of the autocorrelation and the standard devi-
ation of labor income. According to Domeij and Heathcote (2004), existing studies estimate the
autocorrelation of labor income to lie between 0.88 and 0.96 and the standard deviation of labor
income in the range of 0.12 and 0.25. Therefore, I calibrate s and s such that when approxi-
mated by a Markov chain, the obtained Markov chain exhibits the unconditional autocorrelation
of 0.90 and the unconditional standard deviation of 0.20. Notice that it is not a trivial task
because the targets are associated with s`, which includes an endogenous variable `, and not s.
In order to calibrate the parameters for the individual productivity shocks, the model must be
solved repeatedly until the targets are satised. The process yields s = 0:9956 and s = 0:0323.
5.3 Job Turnover Technology
Following Shimer (2005), the following Cobb-Douglas function is used for the aggregate matching
function:




The estimates for  are distributed between 0.4 and 0.72. Shimer (2005) uses the unemployment
data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the help-wanted advertising index constructed
by the Conference Board and obtains  = 0:72. Hall (2005) uses Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data on vacancies, unemployment, and job-nding probability and
obtains  = 0:235. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) use Current Population Survey (CPS) data
to construct the data on unemployment and new matches and the help-wanted advertising index
of the Conference Board and obtain  = 0:4. In order to calibrate , I use the property that
 aects the relative size of the volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Remember that the
volatility of vacancies (14.1 in the U.S. data) is roughly close to that of unemployment (13.0). I
calibrate  to match the relative size of the volatilities of the model. The procedure pins down
 to be 0.66, which is in the middle of the various estimates.
18The separation probability  is set at 0.10, which makes the average tenure of a job in the
model consistent with the average tenure in the data (2.5 years, or 10 quarters). Since a worker
whose match just got destroyed can immediately start searching for the next job, the job nding
probability fw and the separation probability  have to satisfy the following relationship in the
steady state:
fw(U + (1   U)) = (1   U) (37)
With  = 0:10 and U = 0:0567 (the U.S. average unemployment rate), equation (37) implies
that the job nding probability fw is 0.6246. The average V=S ratio is normalized to be one.
This normalization plus the average job nding probability of 0.6246 yields 
 = 0:6246. The
parameter for the cost of posting a vacancy  is calibrated such that in the steady state of the
model, V=S is actually one. Using this procedure,  = 0:1148 is obtained for the baseline model.
5.4 Market Structure
The lower bound of the capital stock holding, a, is set at zero in the baseline model. In one of
the experiments implemented in Section 7, I will investigate how a relaxation of the borrowing
limit aects the cyclical properties of the model.
5.5 Unemployment Insurance
For the standard labor search and matching model, it is not trivial to agree on the target value
of the replacement ratio for unemployment insurance benets for the following two reasons.
First, a variety of numbers could be justied as the monetary value of being unemployed, mainly
because the wage (before becoming unemployed) distribution of unemployed workers is typically
very dierent from the wage distribution of the entire labor force. Second, even if the monetary
value of being unemployed is pinned down, if the model does not explicitly include leisure, the
value of additional leisure when a worker is unemployed needs to be imputed and the replacement
ratio needs to be adjusted.
As for the rst point, the unemployment insurance benet replaces around 60 percent of past
earnings in the U.S. (Hornstein et al. (2005)). However, since those who are unemployed tend to
earn less than the average worker, the ratio of the average unemployment insurance benet and
average earnings is substantially below 60 percent. According to the BLS, the ratio of the average
weekly benet and the average weekly wage is 35 percent between 1951 and 2004. Hornstein
et al. (2005) suggest the value of 20 percent.
As for the second point, Shimer (2005) uses 40 percent as the value of being unemployed
relative to being employed, including the imputed value of leisure. Alternatively, Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) do not set the imputed value of leisure a priori but instead calibrate the
replacement ratio to match the fact that in response to a 1 percent increase in labor productivity,
the wage increases by 0.45 percent. As a result, they calibrate the replacement ratio to be 95.5
percent. At least a part of the dierence between 40 percent and 95.5 percent is attributed to the
value of leisure, and other extra utility in unemployment. As pointed out clearly in Hornstein
et al. (2005), the dierence in the calibrated value of the replacement ratio between Shimer
(2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) generates the dierence in the model's ability to
amplify shocks.
19For the calibration of the baseline model, as for the rst issue, I follow the strategy employed
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008); I do not set any prior with respect to the instantaneous
utility of being unemployed and calibrate the replacement ratio parameter  such that the
baseline model generates the elasticity of the average labor income (measured as compensation
per worker) relative to labor productivity (measured as output per worker) to be 0.56, which is
the empirical value obtained from the data used for Table 1. This procedure produces  = 0:640,
which generates the elasticity of 0.56. Notice that the calibrated  is surprisingly close to 0.60,
which is the replacement ratio relative to the after-tax income during the rst six months after
losing a job, according to the calculation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (1996) and quoted by Hornstein et al. (2005). Notice that the second
issue raised in the preceding paragraph is not an issue because the value of leisure is explicitly
modeled in the current model. The value of leisure is indirectly pinned down when the parameter
  is calibrated such that average hours worked in the model are close to the average hours worked
in the U.S. economy. Notice that there is no freedom in choosing the value of leisure. In other
words, the comparison between the parameter  and the replacement ratio of the unemployment
benets are more direct than the existing studies.
Besides, the 4 percent dierence between the calibrated value of  (64 percent) and the
actual replacement ratio of unemployment insurance benets of 60 percent can probably be
reconciled by elements omitted in the model. For example, on the employment side, commuting
costs, training costs, and child-care costs while working would eectively reduce the income
from employment net of all costs. On the unemployment side, if elements such as irregular jobs
available during unemployment spells or insurance mechanism absent from the current set-up
(for example, staying at parents' house while unemployed) are taken into account, a replacement
ratio of 64 percent might well be reasonable. Overall, it is reasonable to argue that obtaining
the value of unemployment insurance benets of 64 percent through the baseline calibration
procedure to be a success.
The unemployment insurance benets b(s;a) are set such that, in the steady state, the benet
received by a worker of type (s;a) is exactly the proportion  of the disposable labor income
that the worker would receive if the worker were employed. Formally, b(s;a) is set as follows:
b(s;a) = ps`(s;a)w(s;a)(1   ) (38)
where p, `(s;a), and w(s;a) are the labor productivity, hours worked by a type (s;a) worker,
and surplus sharing rule of a match associated with a type (s;a) worker in the steady state,
respectively.
Finally,  is calibrated such that the government budget balances in the steady state. In
other words,  is calibrated such that t = 0 in the steady state. This calibration strategy yields
 = 0:0370 in the baseline calibration.
5.6 Bargaining
The Nash bargaining parameter  is calibrated such that the average shares of workers and rms
out of the total surplus in the steady-state version of the model match the empirical counterparts.
According to NIPA, after-tax corporate prots are about 3.3 percent of the sum of the after-tax
corporate prots and labor income, which corresponds to the rms' share out of the total surplus
20in the model. Neither Shimer (2005) nor Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) targets the size of the
shares of workers and rms, but their calibration strategies imply that the average share of rms




To compute an equilibrium of the model, I use the solution method developed by Krusell and
Smith (1998); I focus on the stationary stochastic recursive equilibrium and compute the ap-
proximation of the original equilibrium. The key component of Krusell and Smith's (1998)
approximation method is to use a nite set of statistics of the type distribution x to represent
x. As a result, instead of dealing with an innitely dimensional object x, one only needs to deal
with a nite set of statistics of x. An interpretation of this approximation method is that agents
in the model are allowed to use partial information of the entire type distribution x when they
make decisions. In this sense, the approximate equilibrium can be called the equilibrium with
partial information or the bounded rationality equilibrium. The important nding of Krusell and
Smith (1998) is that, in their model with both aggregate and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks,
using a very small set of statistics that represent the type distribution is sucient to achieve a
good approximation. This insight helps to greatly reduce the computational cost in the current
model as it does for theirs.
Following the nding of Krusell and Smith (1998), I use the rst moment of the asset distribu-
tion K, and the measure of the employed N to represent the type distribution x. The model here
is more challenging than the model solved by Krusell and Smith (1998), for two reasons. First,
since both the aggregate capital stock and the total measure of employed workers (or the total
measure of unemployed workers) must be a part of the aggregate state variables, the number
of aggregate state variables must be at least two, instead of one in Krusell and Smith (1998).
Second, it is necessary to simultaneously nd ve, instead of one, forecasting functions that are
consistent with the optimal decisions of workers and rms.
6.2 Computation of the Approximate Equilibrium
Computing the approximate equilibrium involves nding ve equilibrium forecasting functions,
which map the aggregate state variables (z;K;N) into capital stock in the next period, K0,
capital output ratio in the current period, K=Y , number of vacancies posted, V , amount of
dividends, d, and government transfer, t, respectively. The ve functions are taken as given in
the optimization problems of workers and rms and must be consistent with the resulting optimal
decisions. Following Krusell and Smith (1998), the ve forecasting functions are parameterized
and thus characterized by a set of coecients. Finding an equilibrium is equivalent to nding
a set of coecients with which the parameterized forecasting functions are consistent with the
aggregate dynamics implied by the optimal decisions of workers and rms.
The value function is approximated using a spline with respect to individual capital holding
a. The optimal decision rules for future capital holding, consumption, and hours worked are
approximated using piecewise-linear functions with respect to current capital holding. Both
value functions and the optimal decision rules are interpolated with piecewise-linear functions
21with respect to the aggregate state variables (K;N). The problem of the workers as well as
that of rms is solved using the value function iteration. Details of the computation, including a
detailed discussion of how to construct the approximate equilibrium, are found in Appendix A.
7 Results
The rst section looks at the aggregate properties of the baseline model economy in the steady
state. Section 7.2 presents the main result of the paper { the cyclical properties of unemployment
and vacancies. Comparison of performance with related models is also provided. Section 7.3
provides analysis of the main result. Section 7.4 presents the other main result, which is the
business cycle properties of the baseline model economy.
7.1 Aggregate Properties in the Steady State
Figure 1 investigates properties of the baseline model economy in the steady state from various
dimensions. First, Figure 1(a) compares total income and the optimal consumption schedule
for employed and unemployed workers. Only income and consumption proles for the medium
productivity workers are shown. The total income is increasing in asset holding because of
the interest income. The optimal consumption level is also increasing in asset holding, for both
employed and unemployed workers. Workers with relatively low levels of assets save and consume
less than the total income. Workers with larger amounts of assets dissave and consume more
than the total income. Workers are saving to prepare for the time either when their individual
productivity becomes lower or when they become unemployed.
More important, employed workers consume more than unemployed workers of the same type
(productivity and asset holding). The size of the dierence in consumption is 26 percent for a
worker with medium productivity and mean asset level. The size of the consumption drop is
not far from some of the empirical estimates. For example, Burgess et al. (1981) nd that the
average household reduced its expenditures by 15.2 percent, but 40 percent of households reduced
their expenditures by 20 percent or more, from the month prior to job loss to the 13th week of
unemployment. On the other hand, Gruber (1997) nds that the average size of the consumption
drop upon job loss is 6.8 percent, although he uses annual food consumption expenditures data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); it is likely that the drop in food consumption
is smaller than the drop in total consumption.
Figure 1(b) compares the optimal consumption schedules for workers with dierent levels of
productivity. Not surprisingly, the higher the productivity is, the more they consume, conditional
on the asset holding. There is a substantial curvature for low-productivity workers with small
levels of assets because their optimal consumption decision is constrained.
Figure 1(c) and Figure 1(d) show the bargaining outcome for workers with dierent produc-
tivity and asset holding. Let's start from hours worked (Figure 1(c)). Since the GHH preference
is used, hours worked do not depend on consumption or asset holding. As expected, workers
with higher productivity work longer hours. Interestingly, Figure 1(d) shows the inverse order;
workers with higher productivity receive a smaller share out of the total surplus. Dispersion of
the labor supply measured in eciency units is larger than the dispersion of labor productivity,
because more productive workers work longer hours, but the dispersion of labor income is smaller
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Figure 1: Aggregate properties of the baseline model economy
23the more productive workers is smaller. In other words, the Nash bargaining solution compresses
the dispersion of labor income. It is a natural consequence of a bargaining outcome between
a risk-averse worker and a risk-neutral rm. The risk-neutral rm is giving insurance to the
risk-averse worker by giving more out of the total surplus when productivity is lower, and the
opposite when productivity is higher.
Figure 1(e) and Figure 1(f) exhibit the distribution of asset holdings in the steady state.
Figure 1(e) shows that there is a spike at the bottom of the asset distribution. Figure 1(f)
compares the Lorenz curve for the baseline model as well as the U.S. economy. The Lorenz
curve from the U.S. economy is based on the ndings of Budr a et al. (2002). Most important
but not surprising, the model cannot generate the high concentration of assets observed in
the U.S. economy, because several elements are missing from the model. First, although the
stochastic process for individual labor productivity is calibrated to match the empirical dispersion
of earnings, the empirical dispersion of earnings is typically computed from a data set that
under-samples extremely rich households, many of whom are entrepreneurs. Second, the model
abstracts from life-cycles, especially the young with few assets. Third, job loss and job nding
probabilities are the same across all workers in the model, but the former (the latter) tends to be
higher (lower) for lower income workers in the data. However, I found that the cyclical properties
of the model do not change substantially even if the model is calibrated to have lower aggregate
savings so that more workers are close to the borrowing limit.
7.2 Cyclical Properties of Unemployment and Vacancies
Table 3 summarizes the business cycle properties of the baseline model economy. The table is
the exact counterpart of Table 1, which exhibits the business cycle properties of the post-war
U.S. economy. In this section, the cyclical properties of unemployment, vacancies, and related
variables are examined, since they are of primary interest in this paper. The next section oers
analysis. In Section 7.4, the cyclical properties of the other variables are investigated.
The most important success of the baseline model is that the model economy replicates
very high volatility of unemployment and vacancies, which Shimer (2005) claims the standard
Mortensen-Pissarides model cannot replicate. The standard deviation of the detrended unem-
ployment rate in the model economy is 10.91 percent, which is substantially higher than that of
output (1.51 percent) and close to the U.S. economy counterpart (12.95 percent). In terms of the
unemployment rate volatility relative to output volatility, the model generates 7.21, while it is
8.19 in the data. For a comparison, Shimer (2005) nds that in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides
model with productivity shocks, the standard deviation of unemployment is 0.9 percent, making
the relative volatility of unemployment 0.45 percent.7 It is worth emphasizing that the current
model economy generates a high volatility of unemployment, while the replacement ratio with
respect to the unemployment insurance benet (0.64) turned out to be a level comparable to the
one in the U.S. economy.
The baseline model also captures other cyclical properties of unemployment. Autocorrelation
7 Note that Shimer (2005) uses labor productivity as the basis of comparison and uses a dierent parameter (105
instead of 1600) for the H-P lter. The standard deviation of H-P-ltered labor productivity and unemployment
is 2.0 percent according to his calculation. But the basic message that the Mortensen-Pissarides model does
not exhibit strong amplication is not aected by these dierences.
24Table 3: Cyclical properties of the baseline model economy1
Relative Auto- Cross-correlation of output with
Variable SD% SD%2 corr xt 2 xt 1 xt xt+1 xt+2
Output 1.51 1.00 0.73 0.48 0.73 1.00 0.73 0.48
Consumption 0.76 0.50 0.74 0.44 0.70 0.99 0.75 0.54
Investment 5.22 3.45 0.72 0.51 0.74 0.99 0.70 0.44
Unemployment rate (u) 10.91 7.21 0.81  0:44  0:69  0:97  0:82  0:59
Vacancies (v) 10.86 7.18 0.53 0.50 0.71 0.93 0.48 0.24
Market tightness (v/u) 18.40 12.16 0.83 0.43 0.68 0.96 0.86 0.62
Job nding probability 4.66 3.08 0.67 0.49 0.72 0.97 0.65 0.41
Aggregate hours 0.92 0.61 0.78 0.47 0.72 0.99 0.77 0.54
Employment 0.65 0.43 0.83 0.44 0.68 0.94 0.80 0.58
Average weekly hours 0.31 0.20 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.97 0.63 0.38
Labor share 0.41 0.27 0.64  0:48  0:71  0:97  0:61  0:36
Output per hour 0.62 0.41 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.97 0.63 0.38
Wage 0.21 0.14 0.69 0.47 0.70 0.96 0.65 0.42
Output per worker 0.93 0.61 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.97 0.63 0.38
Compensation per worker 0.52 0.34 0.67 0.48 0.71 0.97 0.64 0.40
1 All data are in logs and ltered using the H-P lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
2 Relative to the standard deviation of output.
in the model is 0.81, which is strong, albeit slightly lower than its U.S. economy counterpart
(0.87). Unemployment is strongly countercyclical in both economies. The contemporaneous
correlation between unemployment and output is  0:84 in the U.S. and  0:97 in the model.
On the other hand, while unemployment lags the cycle in the U.S. economy, there is no lag
in the baseline model, although the model generates a high persistence of unemployment. The
correlation between output and unemployment in the next quarter in the U.S. economy ( 0:85)
is close to the same statistics of the baseline model ( 0:82).
The baseline model also succeeds in replicating a high observed volatility in the number of
vacancies. The standard deviation of the number of vacancies in the model is 10.86 percent.
It is also signicantly higher than the standard deviation of output (1.51 percent), as in the
U.S. data, although the absolute level is slightly lower than the level in the U.S. economy (14.10
percent). Volatility of vacancies relative to the output volatility is 8.91 in the U.S. data and 7.18
in the baseline model. For a comparison, the Mortensen-Pissarides model calibrated by Shimer
25Table 4: Comparison of cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies1
Economy U V V=U (Ut;Vt) (Ut 1;Vt)
U.S. 12.95 14.10 26.44  0:91  0:91
Baseline model 10.91 10.86 18.40  0:85  0:77
Andolfatto (1996) 1.05 4.58 4.86  0:19  0:65
Merz (1995) 4.95 6.83 n.a.  0:15  0:82
1 All data are quarterly, in logs, and ltered using the H-P lter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.
(2005) yields relative volatility of 1.35.8 Both in the U.S. and in the model economies, vacancies
are strongly procyclical and do not lead or lag the cycle; the contemporaneous correlation with
output is 0.89 in the U.S. economy, while it is 0.93 in the model economy. However, vacancies in
the model are not as persistent as in the data, which is a mirror image of the lack of the lag in
unemployment. The autocorrelation of the number of vacancies posted is 0.91 in the data, while
it is 0.53 in the model economy. The correlation between output and lagged vacancies is 0.82 in
the data but 0.48 in the model.
The market tightness (the ratio between the number of vacancies and the unemployment rate)
is substantially more volatile than output, and strongly procyclical, in both the model and the
U.S. economies. The volatility of the market tightness relative to output volatility is 12.16 in
the model, while it is 16.71 in the data. The contemporaneous correlation with output is 0.96
in the baseline model and 0.89 in the data. Job nding probability in the model is also much
more volatile than output and strongly procyclical, as in the data. Its standard deviation is 4.66
percent in the model and 8.38 percent in the U.S. economy. The contemporaneous correlation
between output and the job nding probability is higher in the model, 0.97, than in the U.S.
economy, 0.82.
7.3 Analysis
7.3.1 Comparison with Previous Models with Labor Market Frictions
Although real business cycle models with labor market search and matching (Andolfatto (1996)
and Merz (1995)) have similar success in terms of replicating various dimensions of the business
cycle properties of the U.S. economy, as shown in the next section, the current model is better in
achieving these while generating the observed cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies.
Table 4 summarizes the comparison. In the models by Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995),
volatilities of unemployment and vacancies are substantially lower compared with those of the
U.S. economy.9 On the other hand, the current model economy exhibits a substantially higher
8 See footnote 7.
9 Andolfatto (1996) relies on the assumption that the mean unemployment rate is 43 percent; it is assumed
that all of the people out of the labor force are actually searching for a job as well. Since the proportion
of the unemployed in his denition is large, the number of vacancies becomes responsive to shocks. That is
why log of the number of vacancies exhibits a decent level of volatility. On the other hand, the volatility of
26variation in unemployment and vacancies.
Moreover, regarding the strong negative correlation between the two (usually expressed as
the downward sloping Beveridge curve), the baseline model generates a high negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies, which is close to the empirical counterpart, while the
previous two models generate a far weaker negative correlation. It is shown in the fourth column
of Table 4. The correlation is  0:91 in the data and  0:85 in the baseline model, while it is
 0:19 in Andolfatto (1996) and  0:15 in Merz (1995). The failure of the models by Andolfatto
(1996) and Merz (1995) is partly due to the timing assumption; both assume that vacancies are
posted after production takes place and consequently unemployment adjusts in the next period,
which implies that a lag of at least a quarter (one period in the model) between aggregate shocks
to output and adjustments in the labor market is forced by assumption. On the other hand, in
the current model, vacancies are posted and unemployment adjusts before production occurs;
unemployment is not forced to adjust one quarter after the number of vacancies adjusts. To make
the point clearer, let us look at the correlation between vacancies and lagged unemployment. It is
shown in the last column. The negative correlation is stronger and closer to the data ( 0:91) in
the models by Andolfatto (1996) ( 0:65) and Merz (1995) ( 0:82), although the baseline model
generates a fairly strong negative correlation ( 0:77) as well.
In sum, the baseline model successfully generates a high volatility of the unemployment rate
and number of vacancies posted and a strong negative correlation between the two, while previous
models failed to generate these features. The previous models are better in generating the
strong persistence of unemployment and consequently unemployment lagging the business cycles.
However, this feature is generated by the assumption that unemployment adjusts with a period
of delay. Even without such an assumption, the baseline model generates a relatively strong
persistence of unemployment. I expect that the baseline model would be improved by having
a stronger persistence if the features of Fujita and Ramey (2007), who generate a sluggish and
hump-shaped response of the number of vacancies within the standard Mortensen-Pissarides
model. I will leave this extension for future research.
7.3.2 Calibration Strategy
Why can the baseline model generate strong amplication? Since the intuition is closely related
to the result by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), I will rst go over their calibration strategy,
and then compare the calibration strategy adopted for the baseline model with theirs in order
to provide the answer to the question.
There are three important parameters in the calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008):
cost of posting a vacancy , worker's Nash bargaining share , and the parameter representing
the 
ow utility of unemployment . I will discuss at the end of this section the interpretation
of the parameter , which is slightly dierent between the Mortensen-Pissarides model used
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and the baseline model. First, they carefully compute the
vacancy posting cost by looking at time spent on hiring and nd that  is small { 3 to 4.5
percent of the quarterly wages of a new hire. Through the free-entry condition, a small vacancy
posting cost implies small prots for a rm from a match. Given the size of the rms' prots,
they calibrate  and  such that (i) the average labor market tightness that is consistent with
log-unemployment rate is very small, because the size of the average unemployment rate is very high.
27the average unemployment rate, and (ii) the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity of
0.449 are satised by the model. Their calibration procedure yields a relatively small  = 0:052
and a very high replacement ratio of  = 0:955. Mortensen-Pissarides model calibrated following
their strategy turns out to have a strong amplication because small average prots of rms and
mildly sticky real wages imply a large volatility of rms' prots. Sticky wages are associated
with volatile prots because stickiness implies that a large proportion of ups and downs of total
surplus is allocated to rms' prots; if the prots of the rms are volatile, so are the number of
vacancies and accordingly unemployment. This intuition is consistent with the claim by Shimer
(2005) and Hall (2005) that real wage stickiness can generate a stronger amplication of the
Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Regarding the intuition behind their calibration results, sticky wages can be obtained in their
calibration because, with a high replacement ratio, workers are close to indierent between being
employed and being unemployed. This small gain from employment is consistent with a small
bargaining power for a worker within a match. A small bargaining power of workers in turn means
that wages are not substantially aected by 
uctuations of total surplus. From this intuition, it
is easy to see that a high replacement ratio (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) obtain 0.955) is an
integral part of their calibration.
Turning to the calibration strategy of the baseline model, rst, instead of calibrating  directly,
I use the rms' aggregate prots over output as a target and calibrate  to match the target. The
size of the rms' prots is small (3.3 percent of GDP), which is consistent with the calibration
of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). I then employed the same calibration strategy to pin down
 = 0:0701 and  = 0:6400. The baseline model developed in the current paper exhibits a strong
amplication because of the same intuition as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
However, it is easy to notice that the replacement ratio parameter  is very dierent between
the value of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (0:955) and the value for the baseline model (0:64).
In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), since the utility function is linear, average labor productivity
is normalized to one, and there is no utility from leisure,  represents the period utility from
unemployment relative to that of employment. Naturally, although it is impossible to system-
atically distinguish,  = 0:955 is considered to include utility from unemployment other than
from unemployment insurance benets, in particular, more time for leisure. On the other hand,
the baseline model developed here explicitly distinguishes utility from leisure and utility from
unemployment insurance benets, and  captures only the latter. In other words, the calibration
of the baseline model implies that a replacement ratio of 30 percent, which is the dierence of 
between theirs and the baseline model, can be interpreted as representing the utility from leisure.
The next section investigates the role of leisure further.
7.3.3 Role of Leisure
In order to investigate the role of leisure in the baseline model, I compute the cyclical properties of
the models without labor-leisure choice. Apart from the additional assumption that hours worked
are inelastic and set at the average hours worked in the baseline model, the same calibration
strategy is used whenever feasible, except for the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance
benets () and the Nash bargaining parameter (). As for , I investigate three dierent values:
The rst model has the replacement ratio used by Shimer (2005) ( = 0:400). The second model
28Table 5: Cyclical properties of the model without labor-leisure choice1
Economy U=Y V=Y V=U=Y (U;V ) L=Y
2
U.S. 8.19 8.91 16.71  0:91 1.00
Baseline model 7.21 7.18 12.16  0:85 0.61
Model without leisure,  = 0:400 1.22 1.37 2.21  0:88 0.07
Model without leisure,  = 0:640 1.87 2.11 3.41  0:88 0.11
Model without leisure,  = 0:955 6.61 7.41 11.91  0:86 0.41
1 All data are quarterly, in logs, and ltered using the H-P lter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600.  represents the replacement ratio of unemployment insur-
ance benets.
2 L denotes total hours.
shares the same replacement ratio as the baseline model ( = 0:640). The comparison between
this model and the baseline model helps us understanding the role of leisure. In the third model,
I use the same replacement ratio used in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) ( = 0:955).  is
xed at the baseline value and not re-calibrated. Table 5 summarizes the cyclical properties of
unemployment and vacancies in the models without leisure, with three dierent values of . The
cyclical properties of the baseline model and the U.S. economy are included in the rst part of
the table, for comparison.
Five remarks are worth making. First, if the utility from leisure is turned o from the base-
line model economy (see the model without leisure and replacement ratio of 0:640), the strong
amplication of the baseline model disappears. The model with a realistic value of  can exhibit
a strong amplication only with the utility from leisure. Second, the model without leisure but
with the same replacement ratio as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (0:955) amplication as
strong as that in the baseline model. This lack of amplication in the model with  = 0:400
(same value as in Shimer (2005)) and the strong amplication in the model with  = 0:955 (value
obtained by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)) together imply that other features of the baseline
model such as risk-averse preferences, neoclassical production technology, and incomplete mar-
kets do not signicantly change the nature of the model from the simple Mortensen-Pissarides
model analyzed by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Third, the strength of
amplication of the model without leisure monotonically increases with the replacement ratio,
for a xed . Fourth, the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is similar across
dierent models. Fifth, the relative (to output) volatility of total hours also increases with the
replacement ratio, but the relative volatility of total hours in the model without leisure cannot
match that of the baseline even with the replacement ratio of 0:955. This is because of the lack
of an adjustment in the intensive margin of labor supply.
In sum, the gains oered by the baseline model developed in the current paper are two-
fold. First, the utility from leisure enables the model to generate a strong amplication with a
reasonable level of the replacement ratio of 0.64. Second, the adjustment in the intensive margin
29Table 6: Cyclical properties of alternative models1
Economy U=Y V=Y V=U=Y (U;V )
U.S. 8.19 8.91 16.71  0:91
Baseline model 7.21 7.18 12.16  0:85
Model with relaxed borrowing limit2 7.21 7.11 12.11  0:85
Model without individual productivity shock 7.11 7.53 12.45  0:86
Model with higher individual productivity volatility3 7.73 7.39 12.79  0:85
1 All data are quarterly, in logs, and ltered using the H-P lter with a smoothing parameter
of 1600.
2 Borrowing limit is set at annual (4 quarters) average income in the model.
3 Standard deviation of individual productivity shocks in increased by 37 percent from the
baseline.
of labor supply increases the size of the 
uctuations in the model and, in particular, makes the
cyclical properties of hours closer to the data.
7.3.4 Role of Market Incompleteness
One of the novel features of the baseline model developed in the current paper is market in-
completeness. How important is this feature in shaping the cyclical properties of unemployment
and vacancies? To answer the question, three alternative models are investigated. First is the
model with a relaxed borrowing constraint. The other two are models with dierent degrees of
individual productivity shocks. Table 6 compares the cyclical properties of unemployment and
vacancies of these alternative models (the bottom three rows) with those of the U.S. economy
(rst row) and the baseline model (second row).
As for the model with a relaxed borrowing constraint, the borrowing limit is relaxed to 12
months (4 quarters) of the average income in the model. Remember that the borrowing limit
is set at zero in the baseline model. Clearly from Table 6, there is no signicant dierence
between the two models with respect to the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies.
Why? Since workers in the baseline model are already well insured only by their own savings,
a relaxed borrowing constraint does not signicantly aect the choice of workers and thus the
aggregate properties of the model. This is consistent with the well-established result that cyclical
properties of macroeconomic aggregates are similar between the complete-markets real business
cycle models and their incomplete-markets counterparts, as shown in Krusell and Smith (1998).
Regarding the role of the individual productivity shocks, two cases are investigated. First,
I study the model without individual productivity shocks (fourth row of Table 6). All workers
are given the average individual productivity of the baseline model, but they are still subject
to aggregate TFP shocks. Second, I increase the standard deviation of the individual produc-
tivity shocks by 37 percent. According to Heathcote et al. (2008), the cross-sectional variance
of log individual wages steadily increased from about 0.25 in the early 1970s to about 0.47 by
302005.10 The 37 percent increase in the individual productivity shocks corresponds to such change
in the cross-sectional variance of wages.11 Notice two things. First, there is no change in how
employment status shocks are insured. Therefore, a model without idiosyncratic productivity
shocks cannot be seen as a model without individual risk. Second, since the shock is to indi-
vidual productivity rather than individual endowment, the interpretation of the model without
idiosyncratic productivity shocks is not straightforward. Regardless, these experiments help us
understand how sensitive the cyclical properties of the model are to changes in the degree of risks
that workers are facing. The results shown in Table 6 are clear; again, the cyclical properties
of unemployment and vacancies of the two alternative models with varying degrees of individual
productivity shocks are similar to those in the baseline model.
7.4 Business Cycle Properties
In this section, I will evaluate other cyclical properties of the baseline model (Table 3) by compar-
ing them with those of the U.S. economy (Table 1). I also compare the baseline model developed
in the current paper with the standard RBC models. Table 7 summarizes the cyclical properties
of the standard RBC model with GHH preference, and those of the complete-markets RBC model
with labor market friction, developed by Andolfatto (1996). For the standard RBC model, the
parameters are calibrated to the same targets as in the baseline model wherever feasible. For the
model by Andolfatto (1996), his calibration is used. However, notice that the stochastic process
for the TFP shock, the only source of business cycle 
uctuations in all models, is the same for
all models, including the baseline model.
Below I will evaluate the cyclical properties of the baseline model in the same order in which
the U.S. business cycle properties are described in Section 3.
1. (Output) The baseline model replicates the size of the volatility and the persistence of
output in the data. The standard deviation of output of the baseline model (1.51 percent)
is surprisingly close to that of the U.S. economy (1.58 percent). Since the shock to TFP
that is fed into the model is estimated from the data, the closeness implies that the model
has an amplication mechanism that is as strong as the one in the U.S. economy. Moreover,
autocorrelation of output is 0.73 in the baseline model, which is lower than 0.84 in the U.S.
economy but still strong. Compared with the baseline model, the standard real business
cycle model with the same GHH preference generates a lower volatility of output (1.19
percent) but a similarly lower autocorrelation (0.72). The dierence from the baseline
model is due to the lack of adjustments in the extensive margin of labor supply. Output
volatility is close to that in the model by Andolfatto (1996). However, the model by
Andolfatto (1996) exhibits an autocorrelation (0.81) that is closer to the data. It is because
the labor market adjustment lags the cycle by the timing assumption, as discussed. If the
timing of the baseline model is changed to be the same as in Andolfatto (1996), the baseline
model shows a similar autocorrelation.
2. (Consumption) Consumption in the baseline model economy replicates the key properties
10 See Figure 2(A) of Heathcote et al. (2008).
11 In particular, I assume that the increase in the cross-sectional variance of wages was induced by an increase in the
volatility of the individual productivity shocks and calibrate the standard deviation of individual productivity
shocks to match the increase in the variance of wages.
31Table 7: Cyclical properties of real business cycle models1
Relative Auto- Cross-correlation of output with
Variable SD% SD%2 corr xt 2 xt 1 xt xt+1 xt+2
Real business cycle (RBC) model with GHH preference
Output 1.19 1.00 0.72 0.47 0.72 1.00 0.72 0.47
Consumption 0.59 0.50 0.73 0.41 0.68 0.99 0.75 0.53
Investment 4.68 3.93 0.71 0.50 0.73 0.99 0.68 0.42
Aggregate hours 0.40 0.33 0.72 0.47 0.72 1.00 0.72 0.47
Output per hour 0.79 0.67 0.71 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.47
Andolfatto (1996)3
Output 1.51 1.00 0.81 0.58 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.58
Consumption 0.43 0.28 0.82 0.34 0.60 0.83 0.74 0.64
Investment 4.72 3.13 0.82 0.61 0.82 0.99 0.79 0.54
Aggregate hours 0.97 0.64 0.89 0.57 0.78 0.96 0.90 0.68
Employment 0.87 0.58 0.86 0.41 0.61 0.82 0.98 0.83
Average weekly hours 0.36 0.24 0.39 0.55 0.63 0.62 0.07  0:17
Labor share 0.16 0.11 0.37  0:50  0:58  0:58  0:03 0.18
Output per hour 0.64 0.42 0.57 0.52 0.74 0.90 0.54 0.35
Wage 0.53 0.35 0.67 0.48 0.72 0.91 0.65 0.48
1 All data are in logs and ltered using the H-P lter with the smoothing parameter of 1600.
2 Relative to the standard deviation of output.
3 Based on author's simulation of Andolfatto's (1996) model. Original calibration is used.
of the U.S. business cycle data; consumption is less volatile than output and strongly
positively correlated with output. However, quantitatively, the volatility of consumption
relative to the output volatility in the model (0.50) is smaller than the level of the U.S.
economy (0.80). In other words, the model exhibits an excess smoothness of consumption.
This is a common property among real business cycle models with only TFP shocks; as
shown in Table 7, consumption volatility relative to output volatility is the same, at 0.50,
as in the standard RBC model, and even lower (0.28) Andolfatto's (1996) model. The
persistence of consumption in the baseline model is weaker than in the U.S. economy. The
autocorrelation is 0.74 in the baseline model and 0.83 in the U.S. economy. This basically
echoes the lower persistence of output in the baseline model.
3. (Investment) Investment in the baseline model replicates the key cyclical properties of
the U.S. data in the sense that investment is substantially more volatile than output and
strongly procyclical. However, the volatility in the baseline model is slightly weaker than in
the data; the standard deviation of investment relative to that of output is 4.64 in the data
32and 3.45 in the model. The standard RBC model and Andolfatto's (1996) model exhibit
similar success in replicating these cyclical properties.
4. (Unemployment and vacancies) As discussed in the previous sections, the baseline
model generates the observed high volatility of unemployment and vacancies. The models
by Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) failed in this dimension. The baseline model also
generates strong countercyclicality of unemployment (correlation of  0:97 in the model
and  0:84 in the data) and strong procyclicality of vacancies (correlation of 0:93 in the
model and 0:89 in the data).
5. (Market tightness) Naturally, the baseline model replicates the high volatility and the
strong procyclicality of the market tightness. Moreover, the baseline model, unlike those by
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), successfully replicates the strong negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies.
6. (Job nding rate) The baseline model replicates the observed large volatility and strong
procyclicality of the job nding rate. The volatility relative to output volatility is 3:08 in
the model and 5:30 in the data. Correlation with output is high both in the baseline model
(0:97) and in the U.S. economy (0:82).
7. (Aggregate hours) The baseline model generates a lower volatility of aggregate hours
than in the data, but replicates its strong procyclicality. The volatility of the aggregate
hours is about the same as the output volatility in the U.S. data, while it is about two-thirds
in the baseline model. The contemporaneous correlation between output and aggregate
hours is 0:99 in the baseline model and 0:87 in the U.S. economy. However, while the
aggregate hours lag the cycle by one quarter in the U.S. economy, there is no lag for the
baseline model. Correlation with a quarter lag (correlation between output and aggregate
hours one quarter later) remains high at 0:89 in the U.S. data but drops to 0:77 in the
baseline model. As I discussed, the model lacks persistence in vacancies posting, which
results in a lack of other macroeconomic aggregates as well. Lack of lag of the aggregate
hours and weaker volatility of aggregate hours are shared by Andolfatto's (1996) model
and the standard RBC model.
8. (Employment and average hours) While the standard RBC model includes only the
adjustment in one margin of labor supply, the 
uctuations of aggregate hours can be broken
down into the extensive and the intensive margins in the baseline model economy as well as
in Andolfatto's (1996) model. The standard deviations of employment (extensive margin)
and average hours worked (intensive margin) are 0.43 and 0.20, respectively, in the baseline
model. In the U.S. economy the volatilities are 1.05 and 0.51. They are higher in the U.S.
economy, but the relative size is similar in both economies; the volatility of the extensive
(intensive) margin is two-thirds (one-third) of the volatility of the aggregate hours. The
model by Andolfatto (1996) generates a similar relative size of volatility.
An important dierence between the extensive and intensive margins in the data is that
employment lags the cycle by a quarter, while the average hours do not lead or lag the cycle.
In the U.S. economy, the contemporaneous correlation between output and employment is
0.80, whereas the correlation between output and employment in the next quarter is higher
33at 0.85. Contemporaneous correlation between output and average hours is 0.72 in the U.S.
economy. The baseline model fails to generate the lag of employment; both employment and
average hours do not lead or lag the cycle, although employment shows stronger persistence.
Correlations between output and contemporaneous and lagged employment are 0:94 and
0:80, respectively, in the baseline. The correlations for the average hours are 0:97 and 0:63
in the model. The model by Andolfatto (1996) successfully generates the lag of employment
by a quarter and no lead or lag for average hours. However, as I discussed, it is due to the
timing assumption, which delays the employment adjustment by a quarter. If the same
timing assumption is used in the baseline model, the model can replicate the lead and lag
structure as in the model by Andolfatto (1996).
9. (Labor share) Another advantage of the current model economy over the standard RBC
model is that labor share 
uctuates over the business cycles in the current model economy,
where labor share of income is constant (equal to labor share parameter of the production
function with the standard Cobb-Douglas production function) over the business cycles in
the standard RBC model. This in turns generates the dierent cyclical properties between
productivity and the real wage, because the average wage is productivity times labor share
in the model. The baseline model economy replicates the features that labor share is less
volatile than output and is countercyclical. However, quantitatively, the properties of the
model economy do not match well their counterparts in the data; in the model economy,
the standard deviation of labor share is 0.41 percent, which is lower than in the data (0.77
percent). The contemporaneous correlation between output and labor share is  0:97 in
the baseline model, which is substantially stronger than in the U.S. economy ( 0:19). The
cyclical properties of labor share in the model by Andolfatto (1996) are somewhere between
the baseline model and the standard RBC model (constant labor share). In particular, the
volatility of labor share is even weaker (relative standard deviation is 0.11 compared with
0.27 in the baseline model) in his model.12
10. (Productivity and wages) Models with labor market friction can generate a diversion
between productivity and wages, which the standard RBC model does not generate. The
baseline model replicates that both productivity (measured by output per hour) and wages
(measured by compensation per hour) are less volatile than output, and both are pro-
cyclical. Quantitatively, however, the volatilities are similar between the two in the data,
while productivity is more volatile in the model; the volatilities of productivity and wages
relative to output volatility are 0.50 and 0.57 in the data, while they are 0.41 and 0.14 in
the baseline model. Volatility of wages is substantially smaller in the model because the
labor share is moving in exactly the opposite direction of productivity over the business
cycles, while the negative correlation is not strong in the data. Regarding the cyclicality,
both productivity and wages are too strongly procyclical in the model. Output per worker
and compensation per worker are both strongly procyclical and less volatile than output,
in both the data and the model. Andolfatto's (1996) model generates similar volatilities
of wages and productivity, but this is possible because volatility of labor share is smaller
12 Choi and R os-Rull (2008) further investigate cyclical properties of labor share generated by the real business
cycle models with labor market search and matching.
34than in the baseline model as well as in the data. Both productivity and wages are strongly
procyclical in his model as well.
8 Conclusion
I combine the incomplete-markets real business cycle model with the Mortensen-Pissarides labor
market search and matching model and investigate the cyclical properties of the model. I nd
that the baseline model can replicate the observed high volatility of unemployment and vacancies
and their strong negative correlation. The success of the current model over the previous models,
including those with labor market friction, is parallel to the success of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) compared with the same model calibrated
by Shimer (2005). The labor-leisure decision plays a crucial role for this main result in two
ways. First, because of the additional utility from leisure, the baseline model has a strong
amplication eect without relying on a very high replacement ratio of unemployment insurance
benets, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). The replacement ratio of 0.64 in the baseline
model can generate as strong an amplication eect as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) with
a much higher replacement ratio of 0.955. In other words, the baseline calibration implies that
utility from leisure is as valuable as approximately 30 percent of the replacement ratio. Second,
the labor-leisure decision adds an extra amplication through the adjustment in the intensive
margin of labor supply. I also investigate the role of market incompleteness, by comparing the
cyclical properties of the baseline model with the model with a relaxed borrowing limit, and
the model with varying degree of individual productivity shocks. I nd that these features do
not signicantly aect the cyclicality of unemployment and vacancies in a sizable manner for
the same reason that the cyclical properties of the incomplete-markets model by Krusell and
Smith (1998) are similar to those in its complete-markets counterpart: Workers in the model,
on average, accumulate enough assets so that self-insurance is sucient for the model to behave
like its complete-markets counterpart in terms of aggregate variables. The baseline model is also
found to improve upon existing models in replicating business cycle properties, mainly through
a stronger amplication and having adjustments in both margins of labor supply.
A variety of future extensions are of interest. First, the performance of the model, especially
the persistence of macroeconomic variables, could be improved by introducing sunk costs for
creating a vacancy, as in Fujita and Ramey (2007). Second, since the model developed in this
paper is built on the standard incomplete-markets general equilibrium model, the model can
be easily used to investigate business cycle and welfare implications of dierent labor market
policies. Third, the model can be used to revisit the question of the cost of eliminating business
cycles and the related analysis of countercyclical scal policy.
35Appendix A Details of Computation
A.1 Approximate Equilibrium
Krusell and Smith (1998) nd that the approximate equilibrium where the aggregate capital stock
instead of the distribution of capital holding is used as an aggregate state variable provides a good
approximation of the true equilibrium where the distribution itself is an aggregate state variable.
Following their insight, the type distribution of workers, x, is represented by the aggregate capital
stock held by workers K, and the total measure of employed workers N. Representing x, which
is an innitely dimensional object, by a set of its statistics (K;N) makes it possible to store
the functions of x in a computer. I will show that using (K;N) is sucient to obtain a good
approximation of the true equilibrium I am interested in. Notice that, as usual, there is a trade-
o between accuracy and computational cost (time). It is usually better to use more statistics
associated with x to improve the accuracy of the approximation. Intuitively, if agents are allowed
to use more information about x, the decision of agents would be closer to the decision in the
true equilibrium where agents can use x when making decision. On the other hand, it takes more
time to solve the model when more statistics are used to represent x. My choice of (K;N) to
represent x is based on the fact that it takes a long time to solve the model even if a small set
of statistics is used.
Using the aggregate state variables (z;K;N), the workers' value function, and the optimal
decision rules are W(z;K;N;e;s;a), ga(z;K;N;e;s;a), and gc(z;K;N;e;s;a), respectively. The
rms' value functions are J(z;K;N;s;a) and e J(z;K; e N). Notice that e N corresponds to e x. The
bargaining outcome is a pair of functions `(z;K;N;s;a) and w(z;K;N;s;a).
The law of motion for the type distribution of workers, e fx(z;x) and fx(z;e x), are replaced by
a pair of laws of motion, 'K(z;K;N) and 'V=S(z;K; e N), where V=S is market tightness. Given
the current e N, market tightness V=S is sucient to compute the size of employment after the
matches are created and destroyed, N. In other words, I use the forecasting function for market
tightness to replace the forecasting function for N. For completeness, the law of motion for
(K;N) can be expressed as follows:
K
0 = 'K(z;K;N) (39)
N = (1   ) e N + fm(S;S'V=S(z;K; e N)) (40)
where S = 1   e N +  e N. It is easy to see that e N0 = N.
To properly dene the workers' problem, it is necessary to give three more forecasting func-
tions: 'K=Y(z;K;N), 'd(z;K;N), and 't(z;K;N). These are forecasting functions for the
capital-output ratio, dividends, and lump-sum transfer from the unemployment insurance pro-
gram, respectively. Using the forecasting function for the capital-output ratio, agents can form
expectations for the interest rate r(z;K;N) and labor productivity p(z;K;N). The forecast-
ing function for dividends and the government lump-sum transfer directly give d(z;K;N) and
t(z;K;N), respectively. The denition of the recursive equilibrium with partial information can
be constructed by basically replacing x with (K;N) in the denition of the original equilibrium.
36A.2 Data Structure
The value function of workers W(z;K;N;e;s;a) is interpolated in the dimension of contin-
uous states (K;N;a). Piecewise-linear interpolation is used for each of K and N, while a
spline interpolation is used for a. The optimal decision rules of workers, ga(z;K;N;e;s;a)
and gc(z;K;N;e;s;a), are interpolated as well. Piecewise-linear interpolation is used for each
of (K;N) and a, respectively. As for the value of the rms, J(z;K;N;s;a) and e J(z;K; e N),
piecewise-linear interpolation is used for each of the aggregate states and the individual asset
holding. The bargaining outcomes w(z;K;N;s;a) and `(z;K;N;s;a) are interpolated using
piecewise-linear interpolation for the aggregate states (K;N) as well as the asset holding a.
The forecasting functions for aggregate capital in the next period, 'K(z;K;N), market tight-
ness, 'V=S(z;K; e N), capital-output ratio, 'K=Y(z;K;N), dividends, 'j(z;K;N), and government
transfer, 't(z;K;N), are parameterized using the following log-linear functional forms. Notice
that d and t are not in log because they can take a negative value. For ease of notation, the set
of all the coecients associated with the ve forecasting functions dened below is denoted as
.
logK

















































































The functional forms above are slightly more general than those used in Krusell and Smith (1998),
because the forecasting function above can include higher order terms associated with log K and
logN. Put dierently, the functional forms used in Krusell and Smith (1998) are the special case
where IK = IN = 1. I nd that there is a substantial improvement in terms of accuracy measured
by adjusted R2 by increasing IK = IN from 1 to 2. Since increasing IK = IN above 2 makes the
convergence hard to obtain, I choose IK = IN = 2 for all model economies. I also found that
including cross-terms of logK and logN does not improve the t of the forecasting functions
substantially. Finally, the type distribution of workers is approximated by storing probability
measure over e X  E  S  e A where e A is the discretized state space of the original asset space
A.
37A.3 Algorithm
The following algorithm, which is based on Krusell and Smith (1998), is used to solve the model.
For the initial condition for the value function of workers and rms, those obtained from the
steady-state economy are used.
1. Set a guess for the coecients of forecasting function 0.
2. Set a guess for the bargaining solution w0(z;K;N;s;a). Notice that `(z;K;N;s;a) can be
easily computed from the associated rst-order condition, due to the GHH utility function.
3. Given 0 and w0(z;K;N;s;a), solve the workers' optimization problem. This step includes
the following sub-steps:
(a) Set a guess for workers' value function W0(z;K;N;e;s;a).
(b) Given the future value W0(z;K;N;e;s;a), bargaining solution, and forecasting func-
tions with coecients 0, update the value function using the workers' Bellman equa-
tion. Denote the updated value function W1(z;K;N;e;s;a).
(c) Compute a distance between W0(z;K;N;e;s;a) and W1(z;K;N;e;s;a) using some
norm (sup-norm is used).
(d) If the distance is smaller than the predetermined tolerance level, this stage is done.
Otherwise, update the value function using W0(z;K;N;e;s;a) = W1(z;K;N;e;s;a)
and go back to step (b).
(e) To speed up the iteration procedure, I use Howard's algorithm.
4. Given 0 and w0(z;K;N;s;a), solve the rms' optimization problem. This step includes
the following sub-steps. Notice that e J(z;K; e N) = 0 and thus there is no need to solve it.
(a) Set a guess for the rms' value function J0(z;K;N;s;a).
(b) Given the future value J0(z;K;N;s;a), bargaining solution, and forecasting functions
with coecients 0, update the value function using the Bellman equation for the
rm. Denote the updated value function J1(z;K;N;s;a).
(c) Compute a distance between J0(z;K;N;s;a) and J1(z;K;N;s;a) using some norm
(sup-norm is used).
(d) If the distance is smaller than the predetermined tolerance level, this stage is done.
Otherwise, update the value function using J0(z;K;N;s;a) = J1(z;K;N;s;a) and go
back to step (b).
5. Using the value functions and the optimal decision rules for workers and the rms obtained
in the last two steps, solve the bargaining problem, and update the bargaining solution.
Again, `(z;K;N;s;a) can be computed easily and there is no need for iteration. Denote
the obtained surplus sharing rule as w1(z;K;N;s;a).
6. Compute a distance between w0(z;K;N;s;a) and w1(z;K;N;s;a) using some norm (sup-
norm is used).
387. If the distance is smaller than the predetermined tolerance level, this stage is done. Oth-
erwise, update the surplus sharing rule and go back to step 3. The surplus sharing rule is
updated as follows, with the parameter w controlling the speed of updating.
w0(z;K;N;s;a) = (1   w)w0(z;K;N;s;a) + ww1(z;K;N;s;a) (46)
8. Using the optimal decision rules and the bargaining solution obtained from the previous
steps, run a simulation of T periods (I use T = 10500). This step involves the following
sub-steps:
(a) Draw a sequence fztgT
t=1, using the Markov transition probability fz
z;z0g.
(b) Set t = 1. Set an initial distribution of workers xt(e;s;a). The stationary distribution
of the steady-state version of the model is used as the initial xt(e;s;a).
(c) Using the current type distribution xt(e;s;a), compute aggregate statistics fKt;Ntg.








(e) Using the optimal decision rules of workers and the number of posted vacancies con-
sistent with the forecasting functions with the coecients 0, update the type distri-
bution and obtain xt+1(e;s;a).
(f) If t = T, stop. Otherwise, set t = t + 1 and go back to step (c).








observation of the rst T0 = 500 periods and keep the remaining T1 = 10000 periods. Use
OLS regressions to obtain the set of coecients 1 that best t the simulated data series.
10. Compute a distance between 0 and 1 using some norm (sup-norm is used).
11. If the distance is smaller than the predetermined tolerance level, the iteration is done.
Otherwise, update  and go back to step 2. Use the following formula to update . In
updating , a conservative updating (low value of ) turns out to be necessary for the
stable implementation of the algorithm, at the cost of longer computational time.
0 = (1   )0 + 1 (47)
A.4 Accuracy
One way to measure the accuracy of the approximated equilibrium is an adjusted R2, which is
summarized in Table 8. The R2 for the dividends d is relatively low because x instead of e x is
used for the forecasting function, which helps to reduce the number of aggregate states. However,
since the size of dividends is very small, the forecasting error of the dividend function does not
signicantly aect the main results.
39Table 8: Accuracy of the approximate equilibrium: baseline
model economy
Adjusted R2
Regressand z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
K0 0.9999999 0.9999997 0.9999991 0.9999996 0.9999995
K=Y 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000
V=S 0.9990510 0.9991965 0.9997627 0.9998746 0.9999166
d 0.9864461 0.9876701 0.9834568 0.9689151 0.9743233
t 0.9999999 0.9999999 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999997
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